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3.1  Introduction 
The organizers of  this conference suggested that we explore the extent to 
which the adjustment of  the last eight years in developing countries has re- 
sulted in increased poverty and inequality. Upon reflection we concluded that 
many of the costs of adjustment cannot be blamed on the adjustment process 
itself, but on the policies that made such adjustment inevitable. In other words, 
the social costs are more related to the size of the adjustment required by the 
misguided policies that lead to that adjustment. 
The object of the paper is then to determine whether a certain set of long- 
term policies that have a built-in bias against large macroeconomic imbalances 
tend to be related to a better than average rate of progress of social indicators. 
A recent paper by  Stanley Fischer (1991) tested  the relationship between 
macroeconomic policies and growth. His cross-section analysis and some case 
studies suggest that reasonable macroeconomic stability is probably necessary 
for sustained growth, but beyond that, the overall economic strategy pursued 
by the country-market  and outward orientation, the size and role of govern- 
ment both in providing physical and social infrastructure especially for human 
capital and in limiting its role in other areas-is  crucial.’ 
Mauricio Cirdenas is an associate of Fedesarrollo, Bogota, Colombia. Miguel Urmtia is general 
manager, Banco de la Rep~blica,  Bogota. Both authors also teach at Universidad de 10s  Andes. 
The authors would like to thank Felipe Barrera and Maria Teresa Ramirez for outstanding re- 
search assistance, as well as Albert0 Carrasquilla and the participants of seminars at Fedesarrollo 
and the Inter-American Development Bank. The usual caveat applies. 
I. Levine and Renelt (1992) provide a comprehensive review of  the empirical cross-country 
growth literature. Using a variant of Learner’s (1983) extreme-bounds analysis, they find that most 
results from existing studies are not robust to the choice of variables in the regression. A strong 
relation between growth and investment, and between investment and trade openness, is one of 
the few results robust to small changes in the conditioning information set. 
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In this paper we explore the role of macroeconomic policy in social prog- 
ress. Although one would expect that macroeconomic stability contributes to 
social progress through its effect on economic growth, some authors have pos- 
tulated  that  stabilization  generates social costs that  overcompensate  for the 
social  benefits  generated  by  economic growth.  Therefore,  we  explore  the 
relationship between macroeconomic stability and social progress, after con- 
trolling for the effects on economic growth. 
The paper adopts two different approaches for testing the hypothesis. In the 
first part, cross-section analysis is used to see whether countries with less vari- 
ance in some crucial macroeconomic variables have higher rates of growth in 
their human development index (independently  from the effect of economic 
growth on this index). In the second part of the paper, the economic growth 
and social progress of four developing countries dependent on coffee exports 
are analyzed  with a view  to evaluating the social impact of institutional  ar- 
rangements that attempt to diminish the fluctuations in various macroeconomic 
variables as changes in terms of trade occur. The hypothesis is that countries 
that avoid large swings in income, consumption, imports, and fiscal deficits 
may achieve greater social progress in the medium and long run. 
The interesting question is not what are the costs of adjustment, but what 
are the costs of institutional arrangements that avoid having to carry out peri- 
odic large macroeconomic adjustments.  If  social indicators improve more in 
countries that minimize the variance of some strategic macroeconomic vari- 
ables, then there would seem to be a good case for the argument that the costs 
of policies and institutions that facilitate macroeconomic stability are less than 
the benefits of such stability. 
3.2  Social Progress in a Cross-Section of Countries 
As mentioned in the introduction, this part of the paper explores the relation- 
ship between macroeconomic stability and social improvement in a large sam- 
ple of countries. Our measure of  social progress (i.e., the dependent variable) 
is the human development index (HDI), as calculated by  the United Nations 
Development Programme (see UNDP 1991 for the exact methodology). The 
index aggregates a set of social indicators that measure life expectancy, educa- 
tional achievement, and income. The index is comparable between countries 
and through time. 
This comparability is achieved by measuring all of the country social indica- 
tors against the best and worst country indicators in the time period studied. 
The formula used to measure social progress between  1970 and 1985 is based 
on the construction of the following indices: 
where i stands for the specific social indicator, j refers to a country, and r refers 
to a year. More precisely, X,  is life expectancy, X,  is adult literacy rates, and X, 81  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
is the log of income per capita. The presumption is that the valuation of income 
diminishes as income rises above an international poverty line (i.e., diminish- 
ing utility of income). HDI,, gives identical weights to each of the three indica- 
tors; that is, 
In this paper social progress is measured by the percentage  change in the 
HDI between  1970 and  1985. UNDP measures such progress for 110 devel- 
oping countries. 
3.2.1  Social Progress and Macroeconomic Performance: Preliminary 
Results 
In the spirit of the new growth literature, we start by  exploring the effects 
on social progress of differences in the average levels in inflation rates, fiscal 
deficits, government expenditures, and GDP growth  rates, across countries. 
Also, we include the level of the HDI in 1970 (HDZ70) as an additional deter- 
minant of  social progress. The hypothesis  in this case is that countries  that 
were relatively worse off at the initial date have experienced faster social prog- 
ress. This result would then mimic a recent empirical finding on growth dy- 
namics, which indicates a force toward convergence in per capita income (after 
controlling for differences in other important determinants of growth rates).2 
Gregory Ingram (1992) has shown that in fact there is better evidence for 
convergence of social indicators than of rates of growth. In the case of growth 
rates, high-income  countries show some convergence, but developing coun- 
tries show divergence of growth rates. On the other hand, there is a sharp con- 
vergence in life expectancy  across countries, and that variable is one of the 
three components of our HDI. Ingram suggests that such convergence is due 
to the international transmission of  techniques that reduce infant mortality at 
relatively  low costs in terms of nontradable inputs. Such techniques include 
inoculation, oral rehydration therapy, and the provision of potable water and 
rudimentary waste-disposal facilities. 
Furthermore,  Ingram also finds convergence in primary school enrollment 
rates, another of the components of the social indicator used in the study. 
In all cases cross-section  data was used to test the statistical significance 
of the relationship of the independent  variables with the HDI. The statistical 
relationships tested were of the type 
(3) 
where i denotes a country and t a time period; ci is a constant; Y is the percent- 
age change in the HDI between 1970  and 1985,  x is a matrix of the independent 
variables used  (explanatory  variables), and IJ.  is the error  in the regression. 
7, = 01 + Px,, + F,,. 
2. See. for example, Romer (1989); Barro (1991); Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992); Easterly, 
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White tests were  implemented  to check for problems  of  heteroskedasticity 
(frequent in this type of estimations). The regressions reported have common 
variance  of the residuals,  which means  there are no problems  with  hetero- 
skedasticity. 
The empirical evidence confirms that in the case of the HDI there is a ten- 
dency toward convergence. In fact, a representative regression gave the follow- 
ing results:3 
(4)  HDI = 66.0 - 0.88HDi70 -  0.02AVGINF + 0.58AVGG, 
(8.5)***  (-7.5)***  (-1.1)  (2.14)** 
R2 = 0.57;  n = 50;  D.W. = 1.54;  F = 20.18***;  where  one 
additional percentage point in the HDi70 diminishes the rate of growth in the 
HDI by  0.88 percentage  points. Average CPI inflation  rate over the period 
1970-85  (AVGINF)  does not come out significant, but has the expected nega- 
tive sign. Average government expenditures as percentage of GDP (AVGG)  are 
positively correlated with the change in the HDI. This is interesting because 
it indicates that government  expenditures help in promoting social progress. 
However, when those expenditures are financed through inflationary  mecha- 
nisms, the effects may be undermined. 
3.2.2  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress: The Evidence 
This section of the paper  tests the  hypothesis that  countries  with  greater 
stability  in  some crucial  macroeconomics  variables  achieve  greater  social 
progress.  The idea is that a country that develops  institutional and political 
arrangements that allow it to avoid large swings in government expenditure or 
fiscal deficits may be able to achieve greater social progress (regardless of the 
level of  those indicators). For example, the presumption is that large fluctua- 
tions in GNP also are harmful for social progress. 
In relation to this last point, we try to see whether large terms of trade (TT)4 
shocks also hinder social progress, either directly or through the effect on GNP 
instability. The effect of instability of  inflation rates on social progress  was 
also tested. 
Interestingly enough, when we include the measures of instability of some 
of  the macroeconomic variables discussed above, it becomes possible to ex- 
plain a relatively large proportion of the variations in the HDI. For instance, 
the  following  equation  produced  an R2 of  0.84 with N = 36  (D.W. = 1.6; 
F = 13.8"""): 
HDI =  74.1 -  0.99HD170 + 3.15AVGGNP 
(6.4)*** (-8.59)"""  (2.72)*** 
3. Throughout the paper asterisks denote significance at these levels: * = 10%. ** = 5%, and 
4. Measured as the ratio of  the unit price of export to the unit price of  imports. 
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(5)  + 1.74DVGNP -  3.78DVFD + 1.66AVGFD + 1.14AVGG 
(0.84)  (- 1.77)*  (1.79)*  (2.4)** 
-  0.77DVG -  4.25DV7T + 0.OlDVINF 
(-0.44)  (- 1.24)  (0.97) 
where the prefixes DV and AVG denote the standard deviation and the average 
of that variable over the period  1970-85.  GNP is the growth rate of output, 
and FD is the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GNP. 
The results show, as expected, that high growth of GNP is positively related 
to improvements in the HDI, as well as to the level of public expenditure as a 
proportion of GNP. This latter result suggests that the HDI improves only with 
active involvement  of  the government  in social expenditure, a circumstance 
that is accompanied by high government expenditure as a proportion of GNP. 
Instability in the fiscal deficit deteriorates the HDI, as well as high average 
levels of fiscal deficit. (The fiscal deficit has a negative sign, so a positive rela- 
tion between the average fiscal deficit and HDI improvement is to be expected.) 
The instability in government expenditures, terms of trade, and inflation vari- 
ables have the right (negative) signs but are not statistically significant. 
In equation (6)  we use coefficients of  variation, or the standard deviation 
divided by the average (CV is the prefix in this case), as a measure of instability, 
instead of  deviations. This would  be more appropriate  in  variables such as 
inflation, which may have very different levels across countries. Equation (6) 
is an alternative to equation (5) (RZ  = 0.81;  N = 36). 
HDI =  77.0 - 1.OHDl70 + 3.26AVGGNP + 0.13 CVGNP 
(6.78)*** (-8.52)***  (2.82)***  (  1 .OO) 
-  0.3 CVFD + 1.99AVGFD + 0.94AVGG -  5.1CW 
(-0.65)  (2.3)**  (2.96)***  (- 1.18)  (6) 
-  1.31CVlNF 
(-0.28) 
The results  are  quite  similar.  Once  again,  in  addition  to average  GDP 
growth, the average relative level of government expenditure is related posi- 
tively to improvement in the HDI and average fiscal deficits are related nega- 
tively with improvements in the HDI. In both equations the initial level of the 
HDI affects HDI growth negatively and in a significant manner, confirming the 
tendency for convergence in our social indicator. 
An  interesting  question is whether  the relationship  between the different 
variables and the HDI differs across continents. To see whether this is the case, 
we decided to test for regional differences  in the effects of these variables. 
This involved  using a set of  regressors  based  on the interaction  of  HDl70, 
CVFD, AVGFD, and  CVlNF with  the  regional dummies for Africa  (DAF), 
Latin America (DAL),  and Asia (DAS).  For example, the effect of the coeffi- 84  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
cient of variation of the fiscal deficit in Latin America is captured by the vari- 
able CVFD*DAL = CVFDAL. The regression gives an impressive R2 of 0.71 
with N = 54. 
HDI =  74.4 -  0,93HDIAF,, -  0.38HDIAS7, -  0.73HDIALl, 
(9.4)***  (-3.2)***  (-1.31)  (-5.05)*** 
-  4.72CVFDAF -  0.08CVFDAS + 0.12CVFDAL 
(7)  (-3.94)***  (-0.04)  (0.22) 
-  2.3AVGFDAF + 0.35AVGFDAS + 0.88AVGFDAL 
(-2.25)**  (0.4)  (0.82) 
- 18.7CVlNFAF -  14.54CVlNFAS -  4.44CVlNFAL 
(- .355)***  (-0.81)  (-0.8) 
By region it appears that the low initial social conditions in Africa and Latin 
America explain a good part of social improvement in those regions. In Africa 
variation in fiscal deficits are negatively related to social progress, and the lev- 
els of fiscal deficits (which have a negative sign) are related to lower improve- 
ments in social indicators. 
Variations in inflation are also negatively related to changes in the HDI in 
Africa. It would therefore appear that in Africa macroeconomic instability is 
clearly related to lack of improvement in the HDI. Surprisingly, these relation- 
ships are not clear in the case of Latin America. 
Since we were able to create a complete data base for eighteen Latin Ameri- 
can countries, a separate set of regressions was run for the region. One specifi- 
cation that gave relatively good results was the following (R2  = 0.74; N = 18): 
HDI =  60.94 -  1.06HDIl, + 4.85AVGGNP + 0.1CVGNP 
(4.8)***  (-3.84)***  (2.03)**  (0.93) 
(8)  -  0.23CVFD + 0.36AVGFD + 0.96AVGG -  4.22CVlNF 
(-0.52)  (0.4)  (1.9)"  (-0.81) 
-  3.5CVRER 
(0.66). 
The HDl70 variable confirms the convergence of social indicators, and the 
positive relationship between GNP growth and improvement in social indica- 
tors again suggests that high growth rates are a good way  to improve social 
indicators. In Latin America the average level of government expenditures also 
explains social progress, suggesting that low fiscal burdens are not conducive 
to improvements in HDI. The signs on the macrovariables are the correct ones, 
but the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. In this equation 
we included the stability of the real exchange rate (RER) on the assumption 
that stable RERs minimize long-run macroeconomic imbalances. The positive 
sign suggests as much, but the t-statistic is quite low. 85  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
3.2.3  Cross-Section Results: Summary 
The cross-country empirical analysis confirms that there is convergence in 
social indicators and that, in addition, high growth rates of GNP improve these 
indicators.  However,  there  is some evidence  suggesting  that  countries  with 
high levels of government expenditure and low levels and variations in fiscal 
deficits tend to experience more rapid improvement in the HDI. 
Fischer (1991) has given some evidence of the positive effect of macroeco- 
nomic orthodoxy  on growth rates. Our analysis points toward the effects of 
macroeconomic orthodoxy on the improvement of social indicators, indepen- 
dent from the effect of macroeconomic policies on growth. This result is strong 
for Africa,  and is less robust  in the case of  Latin America.  However, there 
seems to be little evidence that  low  variations  on GNP per capita  growth 
are related to social improvement. We analyze this point in more detail in sec- 
tion 3.3. 
Some comments should be made with respect to the HDI. The index, which 
covers a large sample of countries, is somewhat primitive. UNDP has tried to 
improve the indicator by adding an index of income distribution and indicators 
of gender discrimination  or human freedom. The improved index, however, 
covers a much smaller sample of countries. Although it would be interesting 
to do the type of cross-section studies discussed here once an HDI with more 
components is available for a sufficiently large sample of countries,  further 
work should be carried out in the development of an HDI that better reflects 
welfare. 
In particular, life expectancy at birth is converging across countries, but the 
health conditions of a person sixty-five years old may be very different in coun- 
tries with different levels of access to health services. In a developing country 
the older person  may have deficient eyesight that could be corrected at low 
cost, or arthritic conditions that could be improved through medical treatment. 
Some index of health condition, even if subjective, should be used with the life 
expectancy index. 
A social indicator should also include some index of housing quality. Such 
an indicator should also include an index of  human freedom and violence, 
factors that clearly  affect people’s  welfare.  In  summary, much work is still 
pending with respect to social indicators. The HDI was chosen for the analysis 
in this paper primarily because it was available for a large number of countries, 
but there is a clear awareness of its imperfections. 
3.3  Business Cycles and Social Progress in a Group of Coffee- 
Producing Countries 
An interesting feature of the analysis carried out in the first part of this paper 
is the lack of an empirical relation between the standard deviation in the rate 
of growth in GDP (arguably a proxy for the business cycle) and our measure 
of  social progress. In this section we look in detail at this issue, refining the 86  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
concept of business cycle and reducing the sample to four developing countries 
with remarkable  similarities in their economic fluctuations. In particular we 
analyze the behavior of some leading social indicators and try to test whether 
macroeconomic stability (i.e., less variance in the cyclical component of GDP) 
is helpful in explaining differences in the rates at which income distribution, 
health, education, and demographic indicators improve over time. 
The emphasis of this section is that the link between growth and improve- 
ment in social indicators is not a policy-free result. For example, in regard to 
the Kuznets curve, some countries (e.g., Indonesia) have been able to avoid the 
worsening in income distribution as growth takes off. If health and education 
are normal goods, then one would expect business and social cycles (as well 
as the trends in the corresponding indicators) to be correlated. Macroeconomic 
stability would then provide the appropriate environment for sustained social 
policies, a key condition for social progress. 
The analysis focuses on  the experiences of  Colombia, Costa Rica,  CBte 
d’Ivoire, and  Kenya, four countries  that are highly dependent on coffee for 
foreign exchange, fiscal revenue, and rural income. Consequently, temporary 
fluctuations in world  coffee prices affect key  macroeconomic variables (in- 
cluding the business cycle) in a similar way. In a typical pattern, high export 
prices  result  in above-trend  levels  of  output,  consumption, investment, and 
government expenditures. In addition, the income effect on imports, as well as 
changes in the RER, often cause countercyclical movements of the balance of 
trade (giving rise to a procyclical pattern in foreign lending). 
Colombia provides, however, an exception to the rule. In fact, the historical 
evidence shows a countercyclical management of both the fiscal accounts and 
(public) external borrowing. In addition, private consumption in Colombia is 
substantially smoother than in the other three countries. Consequently, the am- 
plitude of the business cycle in this country has been lower than in Costa Rica, 
CBte d’Ivoire, and Kenya. The frequency has been, however, remarkably simi- 
lar in these otherwise structurally different countries (see table 3. l).s  In sum, 
given the common external shock (which drives the frequency of the cycle), 
macroeconomic policies have had  an effect in reducing (or augmenting) its 
impact (i.e., the amplitude of the cycle). 
It is customary to think about macroeconomic stability as a desirable out- 
5. In fact, as can be observed in table 3.1. the two Latin American countries are clearly more 
industrialized (and urbanized). Manufacturing sectors in  Cbte d’Ivoire and Kenya account for 
10-13%  of GDP, only half of the shares observed in Colombia and Costa Ria. The degree of 
openness is lower in Colombia, a relatively  larger economy with trade coefficients that fluctuate 
around 13-158.  In contrast, imports and exports usually  account for more than 30% of GDP in 
the other three countries. Colombia is, however, the country with the highest share of coffee in 
total exports. Inflation rates and money growth have traditionally been the highest in Colombia, 
with the exception of Costa Rica during the last decade. Per capita income is highest in Costa Rica, 
US$1,550 in  1987, followed by Colombia (US$1,230). The figure for CBte d’Ivoire (US$750) is 
high  by  sub-Saharan African  standards, which  on average correspond more closely to the  level 
reported for Kenya (US$330). Table 3.1  Structural Characteristics (averages) 
1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-87 
Colombia 
GDP composition (%) 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Trade coefficients (% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and NFS 
Imports of goods and NFS 
Coffee exports/total exports of goods (%) 
Inflation rate (%) 
Growth in MI (%) 
Population (total, midyear, millions) 
Costa Rica 
GDP composition (%) 
Agriculture 
Industry4 
Trade coefficients (% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and NFS 
Imports of goods and NFS 
Coffee 
Bananas 
Shares in total exports of goods (96) 
Inflation rate (%) 
Growth in M  1 (9%) 
Population (total, midyear, millions) 
C6te d’lvoire 
GDP composition (%) 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Trade coefficients (Or, of GDP) 
Exports of goods and NFS 
Imports of goods and NFS 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Shares in total exports of goods (%) 
Inflation rate (%) 
Growth in MI (%) 
Population (total, midyear, millions) 
Kenya 
GDP composition (%) 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Trade coefficients (% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and NFS 
Imports of goods and NFS 
Coffee 
Tea 
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Table 3.1  (continued) 
1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-87 
Infiation rate (70)  N.A.  1.8  6.0  11.2 
Population (total, midyear, millions)  6.913  9.392  13.218  19.349 
Growth in MI (%)  N.A.  N.A.  17.3  11.3 
Memo items (current US$)  I970  1980  1987 
Colombiu 
Current GNP per capita 
External debt (outstanding at end of year, millions) 
Public/publicly guaranteed long-term 
Private nonguaranteed long-term 
COS~U  Rim 
Current GNP per capita 
External debt (outstanding at end of  year, millions) 
Public/publicly guaranteed long-term 
Private nonguaranteed long-term 
C6te d’lvoire 
Current GNP per capita 
External debt (outstanding at end of year, millions) 
Public/publicly guaranteed long-term 
Private nonguaranteed long-term 
Kenya 
Current GNP per capita 
External debt (outstanding at end of  year, millions) 
F’ublic/publicly guaranteed long-term 
Private nonguaranteed long-term 




























Sources: World Bank, World Tables (1976 and 1987);  International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics; and World Bank, World Development Report 1989. 
“Data on manufacturing sector is not available before 1970. 
come, justified by the presumption that preferences are well behaved so that 
individual agents value less variability in their consumption profiles. Also, eco- 
nomic theory has suggested that less unstable (or risky) environments are more 
favorable to investment  (hence, to growth). An  alternative  way  of  thinking 
about this issue, suggested in the introduction, establishes a connection be- 
tween  macroeconomic  stability  and  social  progress.  Thinking  along  these 
lines, this section of the paper tries to answer three interesting questions. First, 
is it generally true that social progress is greater during periods of macroeco- 
nomic stability? Second, is there evidence suggesting that the growth rate in 
the  trend  component  of  some  social  indicators over the  period  1960-89  is 
higher in the country with greatest macroeconomic stability (i.e., Colombia)? 
Third, is there a relationship between the “social” cycle (the cyclical compo- 
nent of those indicators) and the business cycle? In a corollary to this last point, 89  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
do the “social” cycles in these countries seem to be correlated? Or in other 
words, do external shocks have an effect on social indicators? 
Section 3.3.1 presents the main results of the GDP trend-cycle decomposi- 
tion. Section 3.3.2 describes the sharp differences in the levels of the main 
social indicators across this group of countries. In fact, almost always Costa 
Rica ranks first, closely followed by Colombia, while the two African countries 
are substantially behind. A key distinction between their actual socioeconomic 
stance and its rate of improvement is established. The remainder of the paper 
tests the hypotheses outlined in the previous paragraph.  Section 3.3.3 pools 
cross-section and time series data to see whether, across countries, periods of 
lower variance in the business cycle are matched with greater rates of growth 
in the social indicators. Section 3.3.4 looks at the time series evidence on the 
behavior of those indicators, country by country. This section discusses sepa- 
rately the main properties of the trend and cyclical components of some so- 
cial indicators. 
3.3.1  Business Cycle Fluctuations in Colombia, Costa Rica, C8te d’Ivoire, 
and Kenya 
This section presents the main results of a standard Beveridge-Nelson GDP 
trend-cycle decomposition for the four coffee-producing countries under anal- 
ysis. The exercise is somewhat limited by the availability of data, particularly 
for Kenya and C8te d’Ivoire, where the tests have to be carried out with a 
maximum of  thirty observations (World Bank Data covers the period  1950, 
1955, 1960-89). To have a uniform source and time period, the exercises were 
restricted in all cases to the period 1960-89.6 
Interestingly, the tests fail to reject in all cases (with the exception of C8te 
d’Ivoire under some specifications) the presence of unit roots, indicating that 
a difference-stationary representation  is preferred.  Consequently, the model 
estimated for the log of GDP corresponded to 
(94 
k  h 
AY, = F + c  YiAY,?, + c  *i%I&,7 
I= I  ,=I 
(9b)  (1 -  ylL - . . . -  yAk)Ay, = F + (1 + q,L  4-  . . . + *hLh)&,? 
1 + !PIL  + . . . + ThLh  +-  &,, 
1 -  y,L -  . . . -y&k 
F 
1 -  y,L -  . . . -  y&k  (9c)  AY,  = 
where k  and h give the order of the autoregressive and moving-average polyno- 
mials, respectively. Sixteen ARIMA permutations were estimated, for values 
of k and h between zero and four, as well as the corresponding measures of 
persistence suggested in the literature (see Campbell and Perron 1991). 
6. It is possible to reconstruct the Colombian national accounts since 1930 (see, e.g.,  Cudding- 
ton and Urzua 1989). Bulmer-Thomas (1987) has calculated historical GDP  data (1920-84) for 
Costa Rica (and four other Central American countries). 90  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
Table 3.2  Trend-Cycle Decomposition: log(GDP) 
Measures of 
“Persistence”  Deviation from Trend 
Cyclical Component in 92 
Beveridge-  Standard 
Country  Period  ARIMA  Nelson  Cochrane  Deviation  Min.  Max. 
Difference-stationary models 
Colombia  1960-89 
Colombia  1960-89 
Costa Rica  1960-89 
Costa Rica  1960-89 
CBte d’Ivoire  1960-89 
C6te d’lvoire  1960-89 
Kenya  1960-89 
Kenya  1960-89 
Trend stationary models 
Colombia  1960-89 
Costa Rica  1960-89 
C6te d’lvoire  1960-89 







































-  12.86 
-  10.45 
-  10.33 



















Source: Data for the group of  less-developed countries come from the World Bank National Ac- 
counts database. 
Table 3.2 reports the results for those models able to produce white-noise 
residuals where the coefficients of persistence lay between zero and one.’ Fig- 
ure 3.1 depicts the corresponding trend-cycle GDP decomposition for a se- 
lected group of ARIMA models using  the  1960-89  data. A cursory look at 
this figure suggests a remarkably similar pattern in the cyclical component. In 
addition, the evidence seems to suggest that business cycle fluctuations have 
been relatively less volatile in the case of Colombia (as indicated by the stan- 
dard deviation of the cyclical component of GDP). However, the measures of 
persistence and, consequently,  the variability  of  the business  cycle seem to 
depend critically on the particular ARIMA specification, so that caution should 
be exercised in the interpretation of these results. 
Table 3.3 shows the correlation coefficients between the business cycles of 
the countries in question. It is worth noticing the high correlation (above 87%) 
in  the  temporary  component  of  GDP of  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  and  Cbte 
d’Ivoire. In the case of Kenya these coefficients are somewhat lower (ranging 
between 67% and 74%).* 
To  support the hypothesis of a common external shock, table 3.4 displays 
the results of regressing the alternative measures of the business cycle on the 
cyclical  component  of  real  (world)  coffee  prices  (contemporaneous  and 
7. More-than-permanent innovations were excluded on the grounds that innovations to coffee 
prices have zero persistence and, arguably, are the main force driving the business cycle. 
8.  Interestingly, the correlation coefficients between these cycles and those of their main trading 
partners (France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom) are much lower (and even 
negative for some model specifications). See Cirdenas (1991)  for more on this issue. 91  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
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Fig. 3.1 
Source: World Bank Andrex database. 
Coffee producers: Cyclical component of GDP 
lagged) and on the U.S.  real Treasury bill rate. The set of explanatory variables 
also includes the cyclical movements in coffee produ~tion.~  The evidence indi- 
cates  that  this  set of  right-hand-side variables  has  substantial explanatory 
9. Arguably, variations in the size of the crop can induce business cycles either directly (coffee 
is an important component of GDP) or because coffee production is effectively the tax base for 









Colombia  Colombia  Costa Rica  Costa Rica  C6te d’Ivoire  C6te d’Ivoire  Kenya  Kenya 
(0,1,1)  (1,1,3)  (0,1,1)  (0.12)  (031.1)  (0,1,3)  (2.1,O) (1,1,2) 
(O,l,l)  1.000 
(1,1,3)  0.984  1.000 
(O,l,l)  0.907  0.905  1.000 
(0,1,2)  0.906  0.900  0.999  I .000 
(O,l,l)  0.869  0.847  0.897  0.896  1.000 
(0.13)  0.876  0.865  0.904  0.902  0.996  1 .om 
(2,1,0)  0.106  0.126  0.276  0.281  0.216  0.218  1.000 
(l,1,2)  0.672  0.671  0.736  0.740  0.66  1  0.665  0.755  1.000 93  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
Table 3.4  Business Cycle and Coffee Prices, 1961-88  (t-statistic under the 
corresponding coefficient) 
Cycle in  Cycle in  U.S. Real 
Coffee  Coffee  Interest 
Country  Constant  Prices  Production  Rate"  R'  F-Stat  Log-Likelihood 
Colombia  0.0092  0.0163 
Costa Rica  0.0380  0.0668 
CBte d'lvoire  0.0334  0.1 189 
Kenyab  0.01  10  0.0290 
2.6409**  1.8110* 
3.7723** 2.4081  ** 
2.3471** 2.8688** 






2.0047  * 
0.01  87 
1.2673 
-0.0051  0.4292  5.7657  80.0058 
-  3.0700*** 
-0.0205  0.6226  12.6466  49.2508 
-4.8134*** 
-0.0136  0.5140  8.4609  39.8671 
-  2.4968** 
-0.0046  0.6520  8.2429  73.7648 
-  2.4490** 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: ARIMA models used in the derivation of the dependent variable (coefficients are similar for other 
specifications): Colombia (O,l,l);  Costa Rica (O,I,2);  C6te d'Ivoire (0,1,2);  Kenya (I,l,2).  Dependent 
variable: GDP cyclical component. 
dTreasury  bill rate deflated with the U.S. CPI 
bT~o  dummy variables (for 1970  and 1972)  were used in the regressions for Kenya. The observed devia- 
tions from trend for those years are unusual (low and  high, respectively).  maybe due to measurement 
errors, or factors outside the scope of this project (e.g., the liquidation of commonly owned assets with 
Uganda and Tanzania, after the breakup of the economic integration in  1972). Explanatory variables in 
the case of Kenya have been lagged one year. 
*Significance at 10%.  **Significance at 5%. ***Significance at  1%. 
power, accounting for more than 60% of the variance in the business cycle in 
Costa Rica and Kenya (5  1 % in CGte d'Ivoire and 43% in Colombia), 
In particular, coffee price shocks have a positive and significant impact on 
the business cycle, possibly with a one-year lag as in the case of Kenya. The 
size of the coefficient is smaller in Colombia (regardless of the model used in 
obtaining  the cycle). In fact, other things constant, a  100% deviation from 
trend in coffee prices results in 1.6% deviation from trend in Colombia's GDP. 
The same shock would lead to a change in GDP (over trend) of 6.7% in Costa 
Rica, 11.9% in CGte d'Ivoire, and 2.9% in Kenya. 
The coefficients on the cyclical component of coffee production"' are posi- 
tive (as expected) but low in statistical  significance. In fact, only for CGte 
d'Ivoire can one reject the hypothesis of a nonzero coefficient with 90% con- 
fidence. This is interesting, for CGte d'Ivoire is the country where coffee taxa- 
tion is the most pervasive (followed by Colombia, which also has the second 
largest coefficient on that variable). 
Finally, the coefficients for the interest rate variable come out negative, as 
10. Presence of a unit root in the production series was rejected only for CGte d'lvoire.  Conse- 
quently, cycles in coffee output were derived using a difference-stationaq model (ARIMA [0,1,3]) 
for Colombia, Costa Rica, and Kenya. For CGte d'lvoire a trend-stationary specification (ARMA 
[O,l])  was chosen. 94  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
expected, and significant. The size of  the coefficient is larger for Costa Rica 
and C6te d’Ivoire, the two countries with the worst debt indicators in the group. 
3.3.2  Social Indicators 
In spite of the similarities in their business cycles, the group of four coffee 
producers show large disparities in the degree of development. In fact, most 
social  indicators  are quite different  for the  two  African  and  the  two  Latin 
American countries, indicating the presence of other historical, political, and 
economic factors (ignored in this study) that play a decisive role in determining 
the scope of social progress. 
To control for differences in methodology in the construction of the social 
variables, the same data source (the World Bank’s Andrex database) is used in 
all cases (the original database covers 1950-89,  but social variables are rarely 
available for the entire period). 
This section describes the main facts regarding the level of those variables. 
The analysis is restricted to variables available for more than two years, so that 
a rough measure of the improvement throughout time is possible. Finally, the 
analysis is divided in four areas: income distribution, health, education, and 
demographic indicators. 
Income Distribution 
Figure 3.2 shows the pattern of income distribution at three points in time 
during the sample period. Figure 3.2A refers to an early period  (1959-64), 
figure 3.2B to a midpoint  (1969-73),  and figure 3.2C to the latest available 
data (1986-88,  except for Kenya where no information is available after 1976). 
By all standards, income distribution was more concentrated in Colombia dur- 
ing the early part of the period than in any other country under analysis. In 
fact, the share of the top quintile was 67.7%, while the poorest 20% (40%) of 
the population had only 2.1% (6.8%) of total income. C6te d’Ivoire lay at the 
other extreme with a relatively  more egalitarian  distribution  of  income (the 
share of the top quintile was approximately  50%, while the share of bottom 
quintile was 11.7%). Costa Rica was an intermediate case (no data is available 
for Kenya during this period). 
The data for the midpoint (1969-73)  show that, in spite of the reduction in 
the gap between Colombia and the other countries, the ranking in the distribu- 
tion  of  income remained  unchanged  (from more  to less  egalitarian:  C6te 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Costa Rica, and Colombia). By the late 1980s this pattern had 
changed dramatically, to the point that the disparities among Colombia, Costa 
Rica, and C8te d’Ivoire (and 1976 Kenya) had disappeared. This process re- 
flects a substantial improvement in the income distribution of Colombia and a 
worsening in the other countries throughout the period.” 
I I. See Londoiio (1992) for a detailed analysis of  the changes in income distribution in Co- 
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Source: World Bank Andrex database. 
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Health 
Figure 3.3 plots infant (age 0 to  1) mortality rates per thousand live births 
for the countries under analysis during  195 1-89.  The figure suggests that this 
indicator has been  declining  steadily in all cases, except for Colombia and 
Costa Rica during the 1980s. Costa Rica seems to have more instability in this 
indicator (perhaps due to better data), but ranks first, followed by Colombia, 
during the entire period. Infant mortality is much higher in CGte d’Ivoire and 
Kenya (100 and 80 deaths per thousand live births in 1989, respectively). The 
same pattern is observed for crude death rates per thousand people. 
Life expectancy at birth (in years) shows an almost identical (but reciprocal) 
pattern.  Life expectancy  in  1989 ranged  between  seventy-five years  (Costa 
Rica) and fifty-one years (CGte d’Ivoire). The rate of progress has been steady 
in all countries, and there is no tendency (in the sample period) toward conver- 
gence. Finally, data on the number of  physicians per thousand people (figure 
3.4) restates the fact that Costa Rica has much better health indicators. In this 
case progress in Colombia was very  slow between  1960 and 1975 (although 
major improvements have taken place since 1975), while progress in health 
coverage (measured by the number of physicians) has been negligible in C6te 
d’Ivoire and Kenya. 
Education 
Data on education play a critical role in the analysis of this part of the paper 
for several reasons.  First, the number of  variables available  provide a more 
comprehensive picture of  the characteristics  of  social progress.  Second, the 
number of observations per variables is much higher. And third, the data seem 
to be of better quality, evidencing fluctuations in the behavior of the indicators 
throughout tirne.l2 
Once again, educational levels reflect great disparities among the countries 
under analysis. For example, the number of teachers in primary education per 
thousand people aged 5-14  (figure 3.5A), arguably a proxy for the coverage 
and quality of education, shows interesting tendencies. In fact, one can observe 
some movement toward convergence in Costa Rica (which started at a much 
higher level than the others), Colombia, and Kenya. In this last country prog- 
ress has been impressive (moving from four teachers in 1960 to over twelve in 
1985). Costa Rica has fallen in absolute terms since the late 1970s, while Co- 
lombia  stagnated after making strong improvements in the  1960-78  period. 
CGte d’Ivoire also improved until the early 1980s but then declined (in absolute 
terms). Its rate of progress has not been strong enough to overcome the low 
starting point. 
Figure 3.5B  shows the corresponding indicator for teachers in secondary 
education (divided by population aged 15-19). A cursory look at the plot sug- 
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Fig. 3.4  Number of physicians per thousand people 
Source: World Bank Andrex database. 
gests that the two blocs (Africa and Latin America) are more dissimilar than 
before. Progress has been steady in Colombia but in the other countries seems 
more erratic. 
Figure 3.6 displays the gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary edu- 
cation. As opposed to the previous indicator, this variable isolates advances in 
coverage of education (from those relating to the quality of education). In the 98  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
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Source: World Bank Andrex database. 
case of primary education the ratio tends to stabilize (in the long run) around 
values of  loo%, after periods of higher enrollment ratios (while older pupils 
become literate). This is why stability in Costa Rica is no sign of stagnation 
(the relevant variable in this case is secondary  education  enrollment  rates). 
Improvement in the coverage of primary education has been impressive in Co- 
lombia and Kenya. However, in this last country the tendency was reversed in 
the late  1970s (and the ratio  started to fall), while illiteracy rates were still 
higher than 50%. In this sense the continuity in the Colombian improvement 
(on this front) seems to be the exception rather than the rule. This is restated 99  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
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Fig. 3.6  Gross enrollment ratio: (A) primary school; (B) secondary school 
Source: World Bank Andrex database. 
when  one looks at the gross enrollment ratios in secondary education  (fig. 
3.6B). In fact, Colombia now has the highest ratio, surpassing Costa Rica and 
evidencing a substantial improvement since 1960. 
Demographic Indicators 
It is well  known that population  variables involve complex determinants 
(such as the age structure of the population and women’s labor force participa- 
tion, not to mention cultural issues). Nonetheless, these variables can give an 100  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
idea of  how  economic forces tend  to affect family-size  decisions  and, in a 
narrow sense, reflect what we mean by “social” progress. Looking at two indi- 
cators, crude birth rates per thousand people and total fertility rates, we ob- 
serve two interesting stylized facts. First, both rates were quite stable through- 
out the period  1951-89  in  C6te d’Ivoire and Kenya  (declining  in  this  last 
country since 1982). Second, and in sharp contrast, the rates have decreased 
substantially in Colombia and Costa Rica throughout the period. The decline 
has been,  however, steadier in the former than in the latter country. In fact, 
contrary to what happened at the beginning of the sample, crude birth rates are 
now lower in Colombia than in Costa Rica. 
3.3.3  Macroeconomic Stability and Social Progress: Cross-Section Results 
This section presents the results of testing the first hypothesis mentioned in 
the introduction (i.e., whether social progress is greater in periods of macro- 
economic stability). The tests are carried out by pooling cross-section and time 
series data and estimating regressions of the form 
(10)  Yrr  = a + Pxzi + ulo 
where Y,~  is the average annual change in the social indicator  (e.g.,  share of 
income by the richest quintile) in country i during subperiod t (e.g., 1960-65), 
a is a constant, x,~  is the standard deviation in the business cycle of country i 
during subperiod t, and uz,  is the error in the regression. Two alternative meas- 
ures of the business cycle were used (corresponding to a difference-stationary 
[stdl]  and a trend-stationary [std2]  decomposition).13 
The dependent variables chosen can be classified in three groups: income 
distribution, health, and education. The change in the variable was defined in 
absolute terms in some cases (e.g., the income distribution indicators and some 
education  variables) and in percentage  terms in others  (e.g.,  health  indica- 
tors).14 The main results are summarized below (all of them should be taken 
with care, as they are based on very few observations). 
Income Distribution 
Figure 3.7 plots the absolute changes in the share of  income of the fifth 
quintile  (H2O), and the first and second quintiles  (UO)  against the standard 
deviation of the business cycle. It is apparent that the data point corresponding 
to CBte d’Ivoire during 1985-86  is highly implausible, as it reflects a substan- 
tial improvement in income distribution in a very short period of time (from 
one year to the next). This data point was ignored  in the linear regressions 
13. The exact models used were the following ARIMA (p,l,q)  processes: Colombia (1.1.3). 
Costa Rica (O,l,l), CBte d’Ivoire (O,I,3),  and Kenya (I,l,2).  As shown in table 3.2,  these models 
correspond to those with greater variance. The trend-stationary  decomposition corresponds to 
MA( 1) models in all cases. 
14. That is, y,, is alternatively (z,  1965 -  z,  ,9m)/5  or (z,  1960 -  1115, depending on the particular 
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between the two variables, on the grounds that it is probably a measurement 
error (for our purposes  it would  have been better  to leave that point  in the 
sample, since we would have obtained a steeper slope). 
The regressions  came out with the right  sign in  all cases,  implying  that 
higher variance in the business cycle increases income concentration (the share 102  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
of the richest quintile increases while that of the bottom 40% decreases). The 
results are relatively neutral to the specification of the business cycle (we re- 
port those obtained with a trend-stationary decomposition). 
(11)  H20,, = -0.4E  -  02 + 0.108" ~td2,; 
(-0.67)  (1.23) 
R2 = 0.15; D.W. = 1.50; Q (significance level) = 0.81; N = 11. 
(12)  LAO,,  = 0.13E -  01 -  0.28* ~td2~,; 
(0.96)  (- 1.36) 
R'  = 0.17; D.W. = 1.74; Q (significance level) = 0.80; N  = 11. 
The coefficients  on the business cycle are small and  show relatively  low 
statistical significance (ranging from 20% to 24%). Everything else constant, 
a  1 percentage point increase in the standard deviation of  the business cycle 
raises the share of income of the top quintile by 0.001 percentage points (per 
year) and decreases the share of the bottom 40% by 0.003 percentage points. 
Health 
Contrary to the previous results, improvements in health do not seem to be 
dependent on the size of the business cycle. This is not surprising given Costa 
Rica's impressive record in health coverage (and its also impressive economic 
fluctuations). The estimated regressions use the percentage change in the num- 
ber of physicians per thousand people (Phy)  as the dependent variable. Surpris- 
ingly, when the standard deviations of the difference-stationary business cycles 
are used as regressors, the results show a positive (and significant) correlation 
between the two variables. That is. 
(13)  Phy,, = -0.2e  -  02 + 1.45* stdl,,, 
(-0.11)  (2.18)"" 
R2 = 0.28; D.W. = 2.64; Q (significance level) = 0.99; N = 14. 
Interestingly, the variance in the business cycle explains 28% of the variance 
in health progress (as measured by the number of physicians relative to popu- 
lation).15 
Education 
The evidence on improvements in education is somewhat mixed, depending 
on the  indicator chosen. For example, the  absolute change in  the  illiteracy 
(ILL) ratios  (illiterate population  as percentage of  the population  older than 
fifteen) shows a negative correlation with the variance in the business cycle. 
That is, literacy rates rise with macroeconomic instability. 
15. This result is even stronger when the absolute changc (rather than the percentage change) 
in the health indicator is used. 103  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
(14)  ILL, = -0.29  - 11.88" std2,,, 
(-0.86)  (-2.35)** 
R? = 0.38; D.W. = 1.00; Q(significance level) = 0.78; N = 11. 
The opposite is true for changes in enrollment rates in secondary education, 
where the number of observations is substantially larger than in the previous 
regressions. Two alternative measures of these enrollment ratios were used: (2) 
gross enrollment ratios (GERSI)  as obtained directly from the database (which 
use as denominator  the total  population in the country-specific  age bracket 
corresponding to that level of  education); and (2) enrollment rates (GERSZ) 
obtained dividing enrollment levels by the total population aged fifteen to nine- 
teen (so that we control for country-specific variables). In both cases we used 
the absolute changes in the ratios as dependent variables. The results are sum- 
marized by the following two equations, which are robust to the specification 
of the business cycle (we report those obtained with a trend-stationary model). 
GERSI,, = 1.43 - 13.81*  stdZ,,; 
(4.25)"""  (- 1.97)* 
R2 = 0.17; D.W. = 1.92; Q (significance level) = 0.95; N = 21. 
(16)  GERS2,, = 1.1 - 15.22" stdZ,,; 
(4.05)*** (-2.40)*** 
R? = 0.23; D.W. = 1.74; Q (significance level) = 0.22; N = 21. 
These results indicate that the amplitude of the business cycle explains as 
much  as 23%  of  the  variance  in  enrollment  ratios  in secondary  education. 
Other things constant, a  1% increase in the  standard deviation of  the cycle 
reduces enrollment ratios by 0.14-0.15  percentage point (per year). 
Figure 3.8 plots the absolute change (per year in five-year intervals) in gross 
enrollment ratios in primary education for each country against the standard 
deviation in the business cycle for that country and subperiod. A cursory look 
suggests the lack of  correlation between  the two variables. As mentioned in 
the previous section, this could reflect that, for reasons different than the busi- 
ness cycle (i.e., changes in literacy ratios), gross enrollment ratios in primary 
education  have been  declining  in  Colombia  and  Costa  Rica  since the  late 
1970s. It is perhaps more puzzling to explain why the number of teachers (in 
primary and secondary education) relative to population have no apparent rela- 
tion to the business cycle. 
3.3.4 
In this section we look at the time series evidence on the behavior of the 
same group of leading social indicators. The analysis starts with a deterministic 
trend-cycle decomposition of those variables available for a relatively long pe- 
riod  of  time  (lack  of  data  prevents  use  of  unit  root  tests  and  difference- 
Macroeconomic Stability and Social Progress: Time Series Evidence 104  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
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standard deviation of business cycle 
Source: World Bank Andrex database. 
stationary models). Therefore, the decompositions were carried out using a 
standard trend-stationary specification. Table 3.5 presents the results of fitting 
linear trends to eleven social indicators. 
Trend Components 
The trend coefficients measure the average annual rate of  change for a par- 
ticular indicator, and the standard deviation of the residuals is a measure of the 
amplitude in the cyclical component of  the same variable. It is interesting to 
observe that, for all the indicators related to secondary education, Colombia 
has the highest rate of improvement among the group of  coffee-producing na- 
tions under analysis. The number of teachers in secondary education (per thou- 
sand people) increases at a rate of  0.26 per year, while the rates in Kenya, 
Costa Rica, and CGte d’Ivoire are 0.19, 0. 15, and 0.09, respectively. Each year 
there are, on average, 8.5 additional pupils enrolled in secondary education 
(per one thousand people in the age group fifteen to nineteen) in Colombia 
(5.3 in Kenya, 4.4 in Costa Rica, and 2.1 in C8te d’Ivoire). The perhaps more 
accurately measured gross enrollment ratios in secondary education (as given 
by the World Bank) show an annual increase of  1.7 percentage points in Co- 
lombia (almost twice the figure for Costa Rica and CGte d’Ivoire). 
The regressions for gross enrollment rates in primary education indicate that 
Kenya has the best record regarding improvements in basic education coverage 
(2.3 additional pupils per year per one hundred people of primary school age). Table 3.5  Deterministic Trend-Cycle Decomposition for Leading Social 
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The figure for Colombia is 1.7 percentage  points, and C6te d’Ivoire follows 
with  1 percentage point per year. 
Colombia also shows the fastest decrease in crude birth rates per one thou- 
sand people (-0.64  per year). In regard to (crude) death rates the record is less 
impressive. In this case, Colombia ranks third after Kenya and C6te d’Ivoire. 
The improvements  in infant mortality  rates  and in life expectancy  are very 
similar across countries. On average, each year the number of babies that die 
per one thousand born falls by 2-2.6  in these countries. Also, each year babies 
can expect to live half a year more than those born the year before. 
All in all, there seems to be a negative correlation between the trend coeffi- 
cient in these variables and the standard deviation of  the business cycle. Co- 
lombia, the country with more macroeconomic stability, fares relatively  well 
in terms of long-term social progress, as measured by the trend component of 
those indicators. 
Cyclical Components 
The fluctuations in the social indicators around their long-run path (i.e., the 
residuals of the linear trend regressions) can be interpreted as an approxima- 107  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
tion to the concept of “social” cycle. Consequently, the standard deviation of 
those residuals (shown in the last two columns of table 3.5) measures the rela- 
tive stability of  each particular social indicator. 
It is interesting to observe that when the regressions are estimated in loga- 
rithmic form (so that the standard deviation is expressed in percentage devia- 
tions from trend), Colombia’s  social indicators  stand out as being relatively 
more stable. Frequently, it has the least variance (e.g., enrollment rates in sec- 
ondary education), or is close to the minimum level (e.g., teachers in primary 
and secondary education). There are, however, some indicators  that  show a 
relatively high variance (e.g., fertility rates, life expectancy). 
In addition, the evidence suggests that those indicators where fastest prog- 
ress has been achieved are also the ones with more stability. In a way, there is 
some indication  that  social  stability  is associated  with  social  progress  (al- 
though we do not have enough information to provide a definite proof for this 
point). 
Another remarkable fact about the “social” cycle is its high degree of corre- 
lation across countries. Table 3.6 shows the correlation matrices for the cyclical 
components of the leading social indicators. The correlations are usually high 
and positive, suggesting the presence of a common determinant. As in the case 
of  business cycles, the correlations  are particularly  high between  Colombia 
and Costa Rica. The pattern for Cbte d’Ivoire and Kenya is more erratic, occa- 
sionally showing negative coefficients. On average,  and for most indicators, 
there is evidence of strong comovements in these indicators. 
One way of exploring for possible common determinants in the fluctuations 
of social indicators is by estimating regressions where the “social” cycle is the 
dependent variable  and the  business  cycle and  a constant are used  as  re- 
gressors. The presumption  is that business  cycles can explain social cycles. 
Since we  saw that  the  frequency of  the business  cycles is led by  external 
shocks, these regressions would suggest that those shocks also affect  social 
indicators. In a way, stabilization policies would be justified  not only on the 
grounds of (private) consumption  smoothing, but also given the effect of the 
stability in social indicators on their long-run performance. 
As shown in table 3.7 the evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. A large 
fraction of the variance in social cycles can be explained by business cycles. 
For example, in the case of secondary education enrollment rates, RZ  is higher 
than 0.48 in all cases (as high as 0.72 in Costa Rica). In general, the regressions 
for Colombia and Costa Rica are highly powerful in explaining the dependent 
variable: social and business  cycles are very highly correlated in these two 
countries (for several indicators R is higher than 0.75  j. 
The regressions are perhaps less robust for Cbte d’Ivoire and Kenya, espe- 
cially in regard to variables related to the number of teachers in primary and 
secondary education. The regressions that use gross enrollment ratios (primary 
and secondary) are, however, uniformly significant. In conclusion, fluctuations 
in world coffee prices do seem to have procyclical effects on enrollment ratios. Table 3.6  Cyclical Component in: 
Colombia  Costa Rica  CBte d’Ivoire  Kenya 
Teachers in primary education per 1000 
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Table 3.6  (continued) 
Colombia  Costa Rica  CBte d’Ivoire  Kenya 









Life expectancy at birth 
1.000 
0.811  1.000 
0.601  0.144  I .Ooo 
0.144  -0.227  0.806  1.000 
1.000 
0.669  1.000 
0.866  0.468  -0.919  1.000 
-0.797  -0.174  I .Ooo 
Nore: Original variables in rates. 
In addition, large fluctuations in  social indicators do impose constraints  on 
their long-term improvement. 
3.4  Conclusions 
This paper  suggests that macroeconomic  stability is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition to achieve social progress. As the recent literature on the 
political economy of stabilization has shown, the mechanisms for achieving 
stability have to do both with institutions and policies. In particular, institutions 
should give policymakers the incentives to stabilize the economy. Institutions, 
in this sense, are not neutral  to the results. Different arrangements give rise 
to different macroeconomic  outcomes. Institutions, therefore, can be ranked 
according to the policies and the performance of the main macroeconomic in- 
dicators. 
Two important institutions in the developing world are tax systems and com- 
modity  stabilization boards.  Commodity  stabilization mechanisms  have  the 
purpose of taxing windfall gains when prices are high, and cushioning the in- 
come of  commodity  producers  when  prices  decrease,  by  subsidizing  local 
prices with the savings accumulated during the good times. In many countries 
the stabilization objectives of the marketing boards are soon abandoned, and 
such institutions become taxing mechanisms that distort farm prices and main- 
tain expensive bureaucracies. But in some cases, the stabilization mechanism 
does work according to theory, and helps avoid large changes in the aggregate 
consumption of commodity producers. Commodity boards that reflect the pref- 
erences of coffee producers (as in Colombia) are more likely to perform well 
by stabilizing producers’ incomes (and hence the economy). This is not true in 
places where the management of the board reflects the preferences of a highly 
impatient policymaker. In fact, in such cases it is likely that the board intro- 
duces more instability, by  generating a highly procyclical  pattern  in govern- 
ment expenditures (as in CGte d’Ivoire). Table 3.1  Social Cycle versus Business Cycle, 1960-85 (all variables in rates) 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient  t-Stat  R’  N  Residuals 
Teachers in primary education 





Teachers in secondary eduction 





Enrollment in primary education 
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Teachers in secondary education 
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Gross enrollment ratio: primary 

































6.748  0.752  17 
3.962  0.529  16 
0.451  0.015  15 
1.197  0.087  17 
3.004  0.376  17 
0.882  0.089  10 
0.438  0.021  11 
0.644  0.029  16 
7.140  0.773  17 
1.993  0.209  17 
2.438  0.284  17 
0.589  0.023  17 
4.280  0.550  17 
6.571  0.742  17 
-0.357  0.021  8 
0.823  0.043  17 
5.822  0.790  11 
4.350  0.612  14 
0.541  0.035  10 
3.347  0.483  14 
3.198  0.532  11 
5.349  0.722  13 
3.302  0.476  14 
3.248  0.468  14 
7.940  0.798  18 
5.067  0.631  17 
1.139  0.085  16 
2.123  0.220  18 
3.607  0.449  18 
0.948  0.101  10 
0.461  0.023  11 
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Table 3.7  (continued) 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient  t-Stat  R’  N  Residuals 
Enrollment in primary education 




















Enrollment in secondary 
Gross enrollment ratio: primary 

















8.210  0.818  17 
1.949  0.202  17 
2.202  0.244  17 
1.466  0.125  17 
4.469  0.571  17 
5.839  0.694  17 
-0.456  0.033  8 
1.314  0.103  17 
9.095  0.892  12 
4.658  0.625  15 
1.271  0.152  11 
4.840  0.643  15 
2.934  0.463  12 
5.109  0.685  14 
2.917  0.396  15 

















Some tax systems can also be more stabilizing than others. If the income tax 
is a large proportion of tax revenues, the system works as an automatic (income 
and consumption) stabilization device. On the other hand, a tax system very 
dependent on trade taxes may be destabilizing. Tax revenues decrease precisely 
when export prices decrease, generating a fiscal deficit at the same time as a 
trade deficit. 
Institutional change is, however, a difficult task. In some countries it is par- 
ticularly difficult to pass a tax reform or to devalue the currency. There may be 
very strong pressure groups that oppose devaluations, such as the army or an 
urban middle class, and no institutional mechanisms for treating devaluation 
decisions in such a way that these groups have no veto power. In other coun- 
tries, tax reforms are very difficult to implement. For example, in Venezuela, 
a value-added tax has been discussed and proposed for many years, but it has 
never been passed by Congress. In other countries the congress has an interest 
in certain social expenditure programs for electoral reasons, and tax reforms 
are possible. 
In addition, government (social) expenditures are important for promoting 
social progress and human development. The conclusion that we obtain from 112  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
our analysis is that macroeconomic stability has to be matched with sustained 
programs on the part of the state. However, the effects of public expenditures 
that are not properly financed and rely heavily  on the inflation tax  are com- 
pletely undermined. Moreover, the paper provides a strong argument for di- 
minishing fiscal deficits. 
Political structure may determine the level and degree of fluctuation of fiscal 
deficits, variables that we have shown affect social progress. Countries that 
have difficulty adjusting tax systems may thus have to live with discontinuity 
in crucial social programs, and this affects their social welfare indicators. 
The difficulty in  solving budget deficits may also create an inflation  bias, 
insofar as the government tries to use the inflation tax instead of adjusting other 
taxes, This inflation bias would also appear to affect negatively the indicators 
of social progress. 
Policies  also play a role. As has been  mentioned,  a bias toward  stability 
would recommend to policymakers exchange rate and commercial policies that 
favor export diversification. Such policies would tend to diminish the variations 
in tax revenues, balance-of-payments  disequilibria, income, and consumption 
that large changes in terms of trade generate. Clearly policies that attempt to 
maintain  fairly constant RERs also generate stability in the balance of  pay- 
ments and tax  revenues from trade taxes. Policies  with  a strong ideological 
bias against large fiscal deficits (but not necessarily expenditures) and inflation 
probably also favor social progress, if we accept some of  the empirical rela- 
tions found  in this paper. This does not  mean,  however, that fiscal balance 
should always be pursued. As the Colombian experience illustrates, a counter- 
cyclical fiscal policy is the key to macroeconomic (business cycle) stability. 
What it means is that budget surpluses and deficits should not be too large and 
cancel out intertemporally (over relatively short periods of time). 
Many of these stabilizing institutions and policies have costs. This would 
certainly be the case of marketing boards, or a political bias toward increases 
in tax burdens,  which would be the corollary  of political  arrangements that 
facilitate revenue-enhancing  tax reforms. The question is whether the social 
benefits generated by stabilizing institutions and policies are greater than the 
costs. The empirical evidence here suggests that the benefits of fiscal stability 
may be worth the costs. The case studies of the coffee producers indicate the 




GNP  per Capita. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis- 
tics Yearbook 1990 (data 1970-85). 113  Macroeconomic Instability and Social Progress 
Real GDP  per Capita Adjusted  for  Changes in the Terms of  Trade. Taken from 
Robert Summers and Alan Heston, A New Set of International Comparisons 
of Real Product and Price Levels: Estimates for 130 Countries, 1950-1985, 
Review of Income and Wealth 34 (March 1988): 1-25. 
Fiscal Dejicit. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1990 (data 1970-85). 
Injution. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Year- 
book 1990 (data 1970-85). 
Terms of  Trade. For Latin America: Comision Economica para America Lat- 
ina, Statistical  Yearbook for Latin America and  the  Caribbean  I991  (data 
1975-85).  For the others: International Monetary Fund, International Finan- 
cial Statistics Yearbook 1990 (data 1973-85). 
Real Exchange Rate. For Latin America: BID Progreso Econ6mico y Social 
de  AmCrica Latina, Informe 199  1 (data 1975-85).  For other countries: Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990 (data 
1973-85). 
Current Account. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis- 
tics Yearbook 1990 (data 1973-85). 
References 
Barro, Robert.  1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of  Countries. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106 (May): 407-43. 
Bulmer-Thomas,  Victor. 1987. The Political Economy of Central America since 1920. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Campbell, John Y.,  and P.  Perron. 1991. Pitfalls and Opportunities: What Macroecono- 
mists Should Know about Unit Roots. In  S. Fischer, ed., NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Cirdenas, Mauricio.  1991. Coffee Exports, Endogenous State Policies, and the Busi- 
ness Cycle. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. 
Cuddington, John, and Carlos Urzlia. 1989. Trends and Cycles in Colombia’s GDP and 
Fiscal Deficit. Journal of Development Economics 30:325-43. 
Easterly, W., M. Kremer, L. Pritchett, and L. Summers.  1992. Good Policy or Good 
Luck?  Country  Growth  Performance  and  Temporary  Shocks.  Washington, DC: 
World Bank, March. Mimeo. 
Fischer,  Stanley.  1991.  Growth,  Macroeconomics,  and  Development.  In  Stanley 
Fischer, ed., NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Ingram, Gregory. 1992. Social Indicators and Productivity Convergence in Developing 
Countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers,  WPS 894. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 114  Mauricio Cardenas and Miguel Urrutia 
Learner, Edward. 1983. Let’s Take the Con out of Econometrics. American Economic 
Review 73 (March): 3 1-43. 
Levine, Ross, and David Renelt. 1992. A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-country Growth 
Regressions. American Economic Review 82 (4): 942-63. 
Londoiio, Juan Luis. 1992. Human Capital, Income Inequality, and the Development 
Process. Quarterly Journal of Economics forthcoming. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David Wed. 1992. A Contribution to the Em- 
pirics of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 107 (May). 
Romer, Paul.  1989. What Determines the Rate of  Growth of  Technological Change? 
Policy, Planning and Research Working Paper  no. 279. Washington, DC:  World 
Bank. 
United Nations Development Programme. 199  1. Human Development Report. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 